Comments on an optimized protocol for mobile network authentication and security by Martin, Keith M. & Mitchell, Chris J
Comments on an Optimized Protocol for Mobile Network
Authentication and Security 
Keith M. Martina Chris J. Mitchellb
keith.martin@esat.kuleuven.ac.be C.Mitchell@rhbnc.ac.uk
aKatholieke Universiteit Leuven, ESAT-COSIC, Kardinaal Mercierlaan 94, B-3001, Heverlee, Belgium
bInformation Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, U.K.
The level of network authenticationand security offered by a protocol proposed in [3] is considered.
In [3] a protocol was described for providing “mutual au-
thentication” and “key distribution”between a mobile user and
a base station by means of the exchange of public key certifi-
cates. The protocol was specifically designed with the power
consumption restrictions of the mobile device in mind. The
authors explicitly requested interested parties to comment on
the proposed protocol, and we thus provide some remarks on
the authentication and security goals achieved by this particu-
lar protocol.
Setting aside the precise certificate design, the “mutual au-
thentication and key distribution protocol” of [3] involves a
very simple exchange of public key certificates. The base sta-
tion accompanies its certificate with y xb
m
K, where y
m
is the
public key of the mobile user (extracted from the certificate of
the mobile user), x
b
is the secret key of the base station, and
K is the session key (randomly generated by the base station).
We have a number of concerns, regarding both the degree of
“mutual authentication” and the level of security that this pro-
cess achieves. We start by considering what “authentication”
it achieves.
1. Mutual entity authentication [2] provides assurance to
both entities of the identity of the other entity involved
in the protocol. This is clearly not offered by the protocol
in [3] since an attacker can easily intercept a certificate
and replay it on a later occasion (this attack is noted in
[3] but appears not to be of concern). This problem arises
because no time-varying information is used during the
protocol.
2. Key authentication [2], sometimes called implicit key au-
thentication, provides assurance that no entity other than
a specifically identified entity can gain access to the key.
In the protocol in [3] key authentication is provided from
the base station to the mobile user, since only a possessor
of x
m
should be able to “decrypt” the key. There is no
key authentication from the mobile user to the base sta-
tion however, since the mobile user has to trust that the
base station has generated the key on its own and by a
suitable technique.
3. Moreover, the protocol does not provide explicit key au-
thentication [2], in either direction. Although an attacker
active on the user-to-base station interface should not be
able to obtain access to the session key K, there is cer-
tainly nothing to stop them interfering with the transmit-
ted key and sending on noise to the mobile user. There is
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no mechanism for enabling the mobile user to check that
the computed key K is indeed correct.
4. Most worryingly, compromise of just one session key K
leads to effective compromise of the secret key of the base
station x
b
. Although an attacker cannot obtainx
b
, knowl-
edge of a prior session keyK0 allows y xb
m
to be obtained
(assuming the attacker has been monitoring activity on
the user-to-base station interface). The attacker can now
act with impunity against the mobile user in the role of
the base station in this protocol.
We conclude that the achievements of the protocol proposed in
[3] seem rather limited with regards to network authentication
and security. In particular we note that although the precise
authentication and security goals of the protocol are not iden-
tified in [3], the achieved authentication and security goals do
not strike us as strong enough for application in a real mobile
network environment.
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